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Blushing 
ELSPETH PROBYN* 
A lot of people have asked me what an inaugural talk is and what 
it inaugurates. One non-academic friend asked if it was my 
ordination. These strange academic occasions are precious and 
quite rare. Here, surrounded by friends and colleagues, I relaxed 
with wine and canapes, it seems that I'm allowed to hold forth 
about me, or at least about my research (which, as those who 
know me will attest, sometimes amounts to the same thing). 
I'm going to talk about some of my recent research on shame 
but first I must admit that I've never given an inaugural lecture 
before. Many years ago when I was interviewed for a job in the 
United Kingdom, a very high and mighty professor of sociology 
ponderously asked me a question that has stayed with me. 
'Professor Probyn', he intoned across the rather kitsch boardroom, 
'if and the iflingered long, 'if you were to be appointed professor 
at this university and if you were to give your inaugural lecture 
on the state of sociology, what-what pray tell-would you say?' 
I waffled on about how my research connected with the 
field as his eyes glazed over. I'd convinced myself that I was too 
young, too queer and much too colonial-Australian, Canadian 
and Welsh-to get the job, and wasn't terribly surprised when I 
didn't. 
Now that I'm not so young, perhaps I can respond to the 
challenge of placing my research trajectory within a context of 
the fields that have informed me. After a rather unremarkable 
undergraduate degree in French literature, I wandered the world 
working in bars until my grandfather, Tom Clarke, kindly left me 
enough money to undertake graduate studies. I was lucky to find 
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media and communication studies, and all of a sudden I knew 
I was where I wanted to be. It was a great time to be in the field. 
The discipline in North America isn't as young as it is here, and 
in Canada we had a legacy of the great Harold Innis, an economic 
historian who pioneered new ways of thinking about the role of 
communication, which he understood in the broadest of terms as 
the transport of information, people and ideas. From the papyrus 
to the train, he made me understand the economic, social and 
cultural implications of such a view of communication.· 
At the time, in the mid-1980s, debates were burbling: feminism, 
poststructuralism, and then postrnodemism had us arguing around 
seminar tables, spilling into the bars of Montreal. Quebecois 
nationalism and Canadian postcolonialism were mixed in, and as 
the debates roared, I knew that the question of identity was both 
academically exciting and very real to people outside academe. 
Because I spent so many years when I was a student mixing 
study with the financial necessity of working in bars, and because 
I was nurtured on a philosophy that puts trying to understand 
the lived experiences of ordinary individuals foremost, I've long 
known that it matters to try to make ideas matter to people, 
whether or not they be couched in high theory or in newspapers 
or in classrooms. It has taken me a while to write in a less dense 
manner-as my partner tells me, 'stop hiding behind et al. '-but 
the subjects that have driven my interest tend to be about every-
day life. My first book2 developed ideas about the role and the 
uses of the self and personal experience in academic thinking, 
especially in feminist and cultural studies. I was lucky in that, in 
a small way, it was the right book for the times. It developed my 
passion for certain ideas, especially those formulated by Michel 
Foucault, and allowed me to elaborate on questions of subjectivity 
and the self as a personal yet fully social form. In some ways, it 
provided a basis from which much of my work has proceeded. 
My next book3 was about identity and the longing to belong. It 
engaged with the heady debates about queer theory but also 
explored notions of desire as a positive force that fuels ways of 
being. It was also written out of Montreal, a city that compels 
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complex thinking about identity. As a project it covered the time 
when J decided to emigrate here because of the offer of a position 
at the University of Sydney, and the last page was written in 
Sydney. 
Following from that book, I took up Deleuze and Guattari' s 
claim that it is the combination of what they call sexual and 
alimentary regimes that form us in modem society. Carnal 
Appetites4 used food and eating as an alternative optic into the 
regulation of modem culture. If Foucault famously argued that 
from the nineteenth century on sexuality ruled us, it seems to me 
that for many eating constitutes the most pressing problem and 
even the greatest taboo in our society. Across these research 
projects, I have been concerned with how we make meaning in 
our lives through different cultural practices. Big or small, 
questions about the lived textures of lives are what make us human. 
My most recent project, which I want to outline here, continues 
the general thrust of my inquiry. As my writing has moved from 
the abstract conceptualisations which marked my early attempts, 
I've become more and more interested in how to capture and 
convey the textures of life. An attention to the emotions, or what 
are called the affects in more scientific literature, has become 
pressing on at least two registers. On the one level, there is the 
undeniable fact that as a species we have had a tumultuous time of 
it lately. Even before the tragic events of 11 September, the tenor 
of the epoch has been fraught. The unavoidable fact, and 
recognition, of the past injustices of governmental and imperial 
rule has been voiced loudly, most touchingly by those who have 
had little opportunity and few forums in which to do so. The 
enormous changes in industrial life have meant that whole 
segments of the population feel disenfranchised. And, lest we get 
too caught up in a parochial timeframe, those who battled in 
World War II remind us of how long and painful is the shadow of 
that war. For instance, the experience of my father, now in his 
eighties, reminds me of the depth of fear and grief caused by 
World War II. If, as I'll talk about later, shame can be seen as a 
gift passed down through the generations, my father's legacy 
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reminds me of the precariousness, and hence preciousness, of life. 
On another register, within gender and cultural studies there 
has been-arguably-a move to a level of high abstraction that 
has rendered some analyses far removed from reality. Increasingly 
I hear the 'so what' question rattling in my brain. So what? Why 
does this or that beautiful theory matter? I'm certainly not against 
theoretical and conceptual thinking but equally we need to ask 
ourselves why this or that idea matters. 
My interest in shame is positioned between and fed.by these 
two registers. I first became fascinated with shame during the 
events surrounding the Reconciliation Convention in Melbourne 
in 1997 and the fall-out from the report, Bringing them Home. As 
a new Australian I was transfixed by the public's reaction to the 
publication of what we knew-that the practices of the removal 
of especially 'fair' Aboriginals continued up into the early 1970s. 
Attending the Convention, I was amazed by the courage and 
bravado of those who turned their. backs on John Howard--one 
of the more obvious ways of shaming someone. But I was also 
ashamed of my ignorance of Australian history, and perhaps also 
by my decision to leave my native land as if I could shed my 
white Canadian skin, and my family's implication in a history 
of whitelIndigenous Canadian relations, as easily as a snake. As I 
walked the streets of Sydney, and my home in Redfern, public 
expressions of shame were everywhere-shame was written on 
walls, and could be heard in the voices of the famous, and seen in 
the downcast glances of ordinary Australians. 
I soon found myself immersed in the literature on shame. 
While often only fleetingly referred to, shame pops up in a vast 
number of disciplines. My wont to plunge into whole new fields 
is sometimes foolhardy, but when you get very interested in 
something, it quickly seems that the whole world is revealed 
in its light. Falling in love is a good example. As I was writing 
this book, a phrase echoed in my brain like a pesky tune (what 
the Germans call an 'ear worm'): 'shame in love'. It's ambiguous; 
it could refer to the shame that attends being in love, or to being 
in love with shame. Of course, being in love offers endless 
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possibilities for shame. But I've also been uneasily in love with 
. the idea of shame. It's an uneasy affair because shame is not 
usually thought of in a positive light. It's like falling for a seemingly 
reprehensible person and having to convince your friends that the 
loved one has hidden merits. Along the same lines, I want everyone 
to understand that shame is interesting and important: we cannot 
live without it, and nor should we try. 
Shame is the most personal of feelings, but also, as many 
argue, may be what makes us most human. As I wrote Blush,5 
moments of shame erupted. An email arrives from a respected 
colleague. She's angry at a newspaper column I've written. She 
writes: 'Loyalty? Shame? Irony?'. In front of my computer, and 
a hemisphere away from her, I blush. Thoughts of denial flit 
across my mind, but are pushed away by the visceral feeling of 
having done wrong. What can I say but that I'm sorry? It seems 
such a paltry word compared to the shame that covers me. And 
I don't. Or at least not immediately. I waffle in reply about how 
I shouldn't think out loud in print. 
Another moment returns with a blush, and I am back in time. 
I've made a girl cry. We must have been about eight years old. I 
tease her about not having the same name as her mother. She 
starts crying and the nuns at the school chastise me. I'm ashamed, 
even without knowing what I've done. I couldn't have known 
that when her mother remarried she'd taken another man's name. 
The ignorance doesn't stop me from blushing. Now I feel a deeper 
shame at the thought of that little girl crying from the pain of her 
parents'divorce. 
Why is it that the mere recollection of a shameful moment can 
cause you to blush? Distanced in years, an incident returns with 
intensity, and one relives that horrible feeling. As Kim Scott, the 
Aboriginal novelist, writes, 'bury memory deep in shame'.6 The 
shame buried in memory seems to erupt, having lost none of its 
sharp pain. And you blush; the only feeling that physically covers 
the face. In French, one blushes to the whites of the eyes, to the 
ears and to the roots of one's hair. The tentacles of the blush, of 
blood rushing to the face, attest to the inner cringe. 
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Blushing feels bad, and it's a reaction that cannot be faked or 
brought on without experiencing or remembering the feeling of 
shame. Shame makes us feel small, and somehow undone. It's no 
wonder that in most societies, shame tends not to be talked about, 
let alone vaunted. Other negative emotions, such as anger or rage 
or guilt or sadness, are regularly discussed in both popular and 
academic accounts. But shame only makes an appearance in 
discussions about pride, and then only as a shameful feeling. 
National pride, black pride, gay pride, and now fat pride are all 
projects premised on the eradication of shame. As political 
projects, they clearly, and often with very good reasons, denounce 
shame. Increasingly, there is a sense that pride is an entitlement, 
a state we will all achieve once we have overcome our nagging 
feelings of shame, and once society becomes a place where no-
one shames another. 
It's hard not to concur with such hopes-to aspire to live with 
only good and pleasurable emotions. There is nothing pleasurable 
about shame, but there is something immensely interesting about 
shame in all its expressions. Certainly, compared with guilt, shame 
constitutes an acute state of sensitivity. Guilt is easier to get rid 
of, and once dealt with is forgotten, whereas shame lingers deep 
within the self. It carries the uncertainty about oneself, the world 
is revealed anew and the skin feels raw. Shame makes us quiver. 
In his psychoanalytic investigation of shame, Gerhart Piers cites 
this remarkable passage from Hegel: 
Shame does not mean to be ashamed of loving, say on account of 
exposing or surrendering the body ... but to be ashamed that love is 
not complete, that ... there [is] something inimical in oneself which 
keeps love from reaching completion. 
Piers follows with the observation that: 
Behind the feeling of shame stands not the fear of hatred, but the 
fear of contempt which, on an even deeper level of the unconscious, 
spells fear of abandonment, the death by emotional starvation.? 
These descriptions brutally expose the significance of shame. 
Shame emerges as a kind of primal reaction to the proximity of 
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selt and other. The fear of contempt and abandonment is 
experienced as intensely personal, but it also operates at a societal 
level. For many, shame is understood as 'a sickness of the self' . In 
Hegel's words, we hear the anguish of not loving enough, of not 
being lovable. For Piers, the immensity of the social comes crashing 
through. Shame brings the fear of abandonment by society, of 
being left to starve outside the boundaries of humankind. In these 
descriptions, it is a capacity for shame that makes us such fragile 
beings. They suggest that shame may provide a key to the question 
that is now again gaining urgency: what is it to be human? 
I've fallen hard for some of the ideas about shame that I convey 
in my book. The compelling notion of shame's productive role 
I take from the American psychologist Silvan Tomkins (1911-
1991). In the 1950s and 1960s, Tomkins elaborated a complex set 
of ideas about shame and other affects such as joy, anger, disgust 
and contempt. It is from Tomkins that I take the initially startling 
idea that interest and shame are intimately connected. Shame, he 
argues, 'operates only after interest or enjoyment has been 
activated'.8 Once you think about it this becomes obvious. Only 
something or someone that has interested you can produce a flush 
of shame. Someone looks at you with interest and you begin to be 
interested, only to realise she's looking at someone else. Or as 
Tomkins notes: 'one started to smile but found one was smiling at 
a stranger'.9 If you're interested in and care about the interests 
of others you spend much of your life blushing. Conversely, if 
you don't care, then attempts to shame won't move you. 
Shame highlights different levels of interest. Shame puts one's 
self-esteem on the line, and questions our value system. The things 
that make me ashamed have to do with a strong interest in being a 
good person. What that means is normally quite nebulous, but 
once I've felt that hot blush I'm reminded of what it is that I hold 
dear-not hurting people unnecessarily, being generous in my 
ideas and care for others, and so on. My list will be different 
from yours. What shames me may not shame you. But whatever 
it is that shames you will be something important, an essential 
part of yourself. 
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What makes shame remarkable is that it reveals with precision 
our values, hopes and aspirations, beyond the generalities of good 
manners and cultural norms. For instance, sexuality is widely 
held as an area ripe for shame. But it's not a site of shame, or not 
the same site of shame, for everyone. I don't think I've ever been 
shamed for not being a heterosexual, but I have been shamed for 
not being a good homosexual. In other words, banal things that 
are supposed to make us ashamed quite often don't. And those 
things that do make us ashamed reveal deep worries and concerns 
for us as individuals and as a society. Again, interest is the key to 
understanding shame, and shame reminds us with urgency of 
what we are interested in. Shame reminds us about the promises 
we keep to ourselves. 
Interest involves a desire for connection. At a basic level, it 
has to do with our longing for communication, touch, lines of 
entanglement and reciprocity. Consider this passage from 
Tomkins: 
If you like to be kissed and I like to kiss you, we may enjoy each 
other. If you like to be sucked and bitten and I like to suck or bite 
you, we may enjoy each other. If you like to have your skin rubbed 
and I like to do this to you, we can enjoy each other. If you enjoy 
being hugged and I like to hug you, it can be mutually enjoyable ... 
If you enjoy communicating your experiences and ideas and 
aspirations and I enjoy being informed about the experiences, ideas 
and aspirations of others, we can enjoy each other. 1O 
The cadence of the writing bathes the reader in a warm bath of 
love reciprocated. At the same time, it conjures up the terror of 
love and interest not being mutual. The wording captures the 
knife-edge of falling in love: 'we can enjoy each other' jostles 
with 'we may enjoy each other' . Interest is always hedged by the 
conditional 'if'. That 'if' contains the seeds for shame. Tomkins 
follows with a description that speaks of what happens when 
interest falters: 
[Y]ou may crave much body contact and silent communion and 
I wish to talk. You wish to stare deeply into my eyes, but I achieve 
intimacy only in the dark in sexual embrace. You wish to be fed 
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and cared for, and I wish to exhibit myself and be looked at. You 
wish to be hugged and to have your skin rubbed, and I wish to 
reveal myself only by discussing my philosophy of life ... You 
wish to communicate your most personal feelings about me, but I 
can achieve social intimacy only through a commonly shared opinion 
about the merits of something quite impersonal, such as a particular 
theory or branch of knowledge or an automobile. I I 
The acuity of this description is painful as Tomkins describes 
how shame can only appear once interest and enjoyment have 
been felt, and when they have been ripped from you. At that 
moment the sheer disappointment of loss translates into shame 
that attacks your sense of self: the entrails of who you thought 
you were suddenly displayed for all to judge. In Tomkins' 
description: 
The innate activator of shame is the incomplete reduction of interest 
or joy. Hence any barrier to further exploration which partially 
reduces interest ... will activate the lowering of the head and the 
eyes in shame and reduce further exploration or self-exposure.12 
Tomkins' insistence that shame flags 'the incomplete reduction 
of interest and joy' is a crucial insight that propels my own 
argument. It describes shame as an ambiguous state of feeling, 
emotion and affect. It gestures to shame as the fine line or border 
between moving forward into more interest or falling back into 
humiliation. 
While some will find that the ideas I cite resonate deeply, 
others might find it hard to fathom why shame should be considered 
productive. On a basic level, shame always produces effects-
small and large, individual and collective. Shame demands to be 
acknowledged. As we blush, we are made visible at the very 
moment we want to cover our faces and hide. But, equally, shame 
compels an involuntary and immediate reassessment of ourselves: 
why am I ashamed? Why did I say or do that? Can I rectify the 
actions which have either brought shame upon myself or caused 
someone else's shame? Shame in this way is positive in its self-
evaluative role; it can even be self-transforming. This is only 
possible, however, where shame is acknowledged. Denying or 
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eradicating shame, whether by an individual or a community, 
seems futile to me. It is also a waste of an important resource in 
thinking about what it means to be part of human society, and 
what we want that society to be. 
That shame is seen as deeply shameful has important 
implications for what we, as individuals and as a collectivity, can 
do with shame. My argument seeks to investigate why it is 
considered shaming to admit to shame. After all, people freely 
admit to other negative affects, such as anger. Compared to anger, 
which can lead to violence, admitting shame is much more likely 
to spur consideration of why one feels ashamed. Shame, it is 
argued, can entail self-evaluation and transformation. To consider 
shame is not to wallow in self-pity, nor in the resentment that 
accompanies guilt. It is to recognise that the reduction of interest 
that prompts shame is always incomplete. As such, shame 
promises a return of interest, joy and connection. This is why 
shame matters to individuals. And ·it is why studies of shame are 
important. This is also why it is so important that shame be talked 
about openly in our society. 
Different disciplines have thought about shame in different 
ways. On the more scientific side of psychology, shame tells us 
something about how our bodies dictate what we feel. In 
anthropology and sociology, studies of shame provide fascinating 
glimpses into quite different ways of managing social life. I think 
that we need to be more open to ideas that seem to be beyond our 
intellectual comfort zone. 
Across my career I've experimented with different academic 
styles. Increasingly all I want to do is to tell stories, sometimes 
my own, and sometimes those of others. The emphasis on narrative 
is important when you're dealing with new ideas and new ways of 
being. With something as sensitive as shame, it's foolhardy to 
weigh in with ready-made theories or pronouncements. So I try 
not to. My stories are told in the spirit of experimentation: wouldn't 
it be interesting if we could all talk about shame in more productive 
ways? 
My research on shame also extends a rich tradition of feminist 
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research on embodiment, which has preoccupied me for years. 
In this, I have been inspired by the philosophical approaches of 
Moira Gatens and an important strain of Australian feminism on 
corporeality. The deep-rooted mindlbody split in our culture 
continues to reverberate. Over the years many feminists argued 
for a cultural conception of the body and a critique of biologism. 
Given how often women are subsumed in the body and how a 
cultural dismissal of the body has allowed for certain forms 
of discrimination, the attack on biology was necessary. However 
shame has renewed and redirected my interest in the body and 
more precisely in the physiological. Shame experienced in the 
cringing blush reminds us that we experience a multitude of 
sensations and receive so much more information from the body 
than our continuing emphasis on cognition can allow for. 
For instance, in my book, Blush, I narrate a moment of shame 
I felt when I first experienced the awesome power of Uluru. 
Coming across the sight of that monument of nature and of 
Australian Aboriginal culture, I was physically struck by a variant 
of shame I call the shame of being out-of-place. This is the feeling 
the body registers in social and cultural contexts when it doesn't 
belong. When you feel like a fish out of water, your body reacts 
in shame. I draw on the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu's 
thoughts about habitus-a term he uses to describe how we 
embody history. The body is a repository for the social and cultural 
rules that, consciously or not, we take on. Our bodies can also tell 
us when we have stumbled into other people's history, culture 
and beliefs of which we are ignorant. Through my own story and 
those of others, I explore how the shame of being out-of-place 
can ignite a desire for connection. In the Australian context, that 
desire is called Reconciliation. It is an inspiration for modes of 
co-existence between non-Indigenous and Indigenous that can 
only succeed if we acknowledge different types of shame and 
interest. 
Shame always moves from the individual body into the body 
politic. While shaming people is a powerful and potentially 
destructive and violent way to patrol the borders of normality, in 
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some societies it has been used to good effect to manage anti-
social behavior. It all depends on the structure of the society and 
how it uses shaming. John Braithwaite',13 who has made shaming 
an important topic within criminology, bases his theory on a 
Maori tradition of shaming members of a community who break 
its rules. His ideas about reintegrative shaming have influenced 
policy in several contexts. Some of these are questionable-does 
shaming as a tactic for punishment and deterrence work in a 
western context where community bonds are not the ·norm and 
there is often little desire to be reintegrated into a community? 
These questions demand precise and grounded studies which are 
beyond the scope of this talk. However, Braithwaite's ideas spark 
off thoughts about forms of shaming: who is shamed and who is 
the shamer. I use them to consider how in popular perception 
feminism has taken the moral high ground in order to shame 
men, and sometimes women. It's a rough critique, but I stand by 
the argument that any politics not interested in those it sees as 
outside its ken will ultimately fail to interest and engage. 
I've also used shame to mine what psychoanalysts call 
'ancestral shame'. I mentioned earlier the idea that shame can 
be gifted down through the generations, which came from my 
thinking about the shame that has shadowed my family as we 
traipsed across various British colonies. Years ago I came across 
a poem written by my grandmother, Elspeth Honeyman-Clarke. 
My grandfather was an engineer who was busily paving over the 
land and sometimes the cultures of the Indigenous people in 
northern British Columbia, and she wrote and published her poems 
while living in tipees and educating my uncle and mother. The 
poem in question is called 'Half breed' and as you can imagine I 
was shocked and experienced a sort of vicarious familial shame. 
However, as I read and researched shame, I became interested in 
how the individual and the historical can be rethought. When 
very different people and ideas are brought together, sometimes 
in violence, and less often in affection, powerful emotions are 
produced. In my grandmother's poem I found types of shame 
that might be used to produce an intimate history of shame. 
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Along with red hair, 1 think that I inherited from her a sensitivity 
. to shame and a desire to explore its effects. I certainly got her 
itch to write. 
The last point that I'll raise has to do with my interest in 
writing, in genres and in learning to write well. I've come to 
think of this within the rubric of 'writing shame', and the 
possibility of a shame-based ethics of writing. My argument is 
that a form of shame always attends the writer. Primarily it is the 
shame of not being equal to the interest of one's subject. Thinking 
about writers as diverse as Stephen King, Gilles Deleuze and 
Primo Levi, I realised the different ways they tell us about the 
seriousness of writing, how writing shame radically rearranges 
bodies, and the precision and passion that constitutes honest 
writing. As I mentioned earlier, it seems to me that sometimes 
cultural theory gets carried away, forgetting that theories and 
theoretical writing are of interest for what they can do, what they 
let us understand, and what they make us question. 
I realise that I've travelled quite quickly and in insufficient 
detail across a number of concerns. But that is probably what has 
marked my career. Its positive side is that it allows me to 
continually question a number of preoccupations-such as 
subjectivity, feelings, the body and writing-from a number of 
angles: always asking, I wonder what it would look like from 
here, or from there. 
I feel immensely fortunate in my chosen career. Sure, there 
are annoying aspects of our jobs, but really how lucky can one 
get to be able to read and think widely, to have students and 
colleagues with whom to discuss ideas. And then to cap it all off, 
one has occasions like this. So my thanks to you all for coming to 
listen to me ramble across my life and career. 
Notes 
My thanks to the wonderful crowd of friends and colleagues who came, 
to Angus Martin, Elizabeth Webby and Catharine Lumby. 
2 Sexing the Self" Gendered Positions in Cultural Studies, London and 
New York, 1993. 
93 
3 Outside Belongings, New York and London, 1996. 
4 Carnal Appetites: FoodSexldentity, New York and London, 2000. 
5 Blush: Faces of Shame, Minneapolis and Sydney, 2005. 
6 Kim Scott, Benang: from the heart, South Fremantle, Western Australia, 
1999, p.3l. 
7 Gerhart Piers, 'Shame and Guilt: Part 1', in G. Piers and M. B. Singer, 
eds, Shame and Guilt: A Psychoanalytic Study, Springfield, Illinois, 
1953, p.16. 
8 Cited in Eve Sedgwick and Adam Frank, 'Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: 
Reading Silvan Tomkins', in Sedgwick and Frank, eds, Shame and its 
Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader, Durham, 1995, p.5. 
9 Sedgwick and Frank, p.4. 
10 Sedgwick and Frank, p.4. 
11 Sedgwick and Frank, pA. 
12 Sedgwick and Frank, p.5. 
13 John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration, Cambridge, 1989. 
94 
